A reappraisal of the Hirschman 'exit, voice and loyalty' scheme to interpret immigrants’ political participation in their origin countries by GABRIELLI, Lorenzo & ZAPATA-BARRERO, Ricard
INTERACT –  REsEARChINg ThIRd CouNTRy NATIoNAls’ INTEgRATIoN  As A 
ThREE-wAy PRoCEss - ImmIgRANTs, CouNTRIEs of EmIgRATIoN 
ANd CouNTRIEs of ImmIgRATIoN As ACToRs of INTEgRATIoN
A reappraisal of the Hirschman “exit,
voice and loyalty” scheme to interpret 
immigrants’ political participation
in their origin countries
  
Lorenzo Gabrielli 
Ricard Zapata-Barrero
 
INTERACT Research Report 2015/11              
CEDEM
INTERACT 
Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - 
Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of 
Integration 
 
 
Research Report 
Conceptual Paper 
INTERACT RR 2015/11 
A reappraisal of the Hirschman “exit, voice and loyalty” scheme  
to interpret immigrants’ political participation in their origin countries 
Lorenzo Gabrielli * 
Ricard Zapata-Barrero *  
* GRITIM-UPF Barcelona 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies. 
Requests should be addressed to mpc@eui.eu  
 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made as follows: 
 
Lorenzo Gabrielli, Ricard Zapata-Barrero, A reappraisal of the Hirschman “exit, voice and loyalty” 
scheme to interpret immigrants’ political participation in their origin countries, INTERACT RR 
2015/11, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European 
University Institute, 2015. 
 
The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and should not be considered as representative 
of the official position of the European Commission or of the European University Institute. 
 
© 2015, European University Institute 
 
ISBN: 978-92-9084-295-8 
doi:10.2870/907134 
Catalogue Number: QM-01-15-380-EN-N 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
http://interact-project.eu/publications/ 
http://cadmus.eui.eu 
 
INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - 
Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration 
In 2013 (Jan. 1st), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in 
the European Union (EU), representing 7% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. 
allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, 
process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a 
cohesive society. 
Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving 
state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: 
first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, 
migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact 
between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, 
and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all 
transformed the way migrants interact with their home country. 
INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin 
countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that 
operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive 
cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights). 
INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU 
member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in 
origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective 
contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in 
their way? 
A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in 
the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of 
migrants in the host country remains to be done. 
 
INTERACT is co-financed by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built by 
CEDEM, UPF and MPI Europe. 
 
For more information: 
INTERACT 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI) 
Villa Malafrasca 
Via Boccaccio 151 
50133 Florence 
Italy 
Tel: +39 055 46 85 817/892 
Fax: + 39 055 46 85 755 
Email: mpc@eui.eu 
 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/
Abstract 
In this article, we apply Hirschman’s well-known distinction between voice, exit, and loyalty as an 
interpretative framework for looking at the political participation of immigrants in their origin 
countries and at their connections with state and non-state actors. Hirschman articulated these three 
options as mutually exclusive, but in our reappraisal of this scheme we consider these options 
overlapping and simultaneous. We can then distinguish immigrants’ political actions as constituting a 
specific combination of these three options. Having already exercised their right to move, immigrants 
can steer their political activities towards the origin country, following two different options: “voice” 
or “loyalty”. An exit may lead to the transnationalisation/internationalisation of the voice option or 
otherwise, to political activities inspired by loyalty towards the origin state. 
We will also argue that these options are in the hands of immigrants, but can also be promoted by 
origin states and civil society actors, who may oppose each other on some points. The State of origin’s 
interest is in maintaining their emigrants’ loyalty option, in spite of the fact that they have used an exit 
option, or at least searching for a political containment of their citizen abroad. However, civil society 
groups at origin can try to develop the voice option, through the activities of emigrants, despite (lesser 
or stronger) opposition from state actors. 
Finally, we will introduce the assumption that immigrants’ political actions towards their country of 
origin are related to the interpretation of their exit reasons. When migration is perceived as a 
consequence of a political situation, the result is a voice option channelling protest jointly with origin 
societies. On the contrary, when the exit is perceived as more of an economic issue, immigrants 
maintain stronger links with the origin State and loyalty towards its institutions. 
Key words: Hirschman, immigrant political participation, countries of origin/emigration countries, 
transnationalism, emigration policy, diaspora policy 
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1. Concept definition: emigrants’ political participation, their direction, and the 
classification of actors in the countries of origin 
Transnational political practices of emigrants are a growing phenomenon, which increased in the last 
decades through the expansion of migration flows and the development of new technologies able to 
more easily link emigrants with their countries of origin. From a theoretical point of view, a branch of 
the existing literature on migrants’ political participation focuses on migrants’ transnational practices 
in this field and produces some very useful hints on the actions of migrants and non-state actors in 
origin countries (Faist and Bauböck 2010; Levitt 2003; Lyon and Uçarer 2004; Mügge 2011; 
Østergaard-Nielsen 2001, 2003a, and 2003b; Wald 2008). Other scholars researching diaspora and 
emigration policies have conducted in-depth analyses of the actions of state actors towards the 
political activities of citizens abroad (Cohen 1997; De Haas 2007; Fitzgerald 2006; Itzigsohn 2000; 
Gamlen 2006, and 2008; Koslowsky 2004; Sheffer 2006). Nevertheless, an interpretative framework 
capable of relating the political participation of migrants with the actions of the different actors in the 
countries of origin is still missing. 
Considering this lack, our objective is to develop a new framework in order to interpret in depth the 
political participation of migrants towards their origin countries, taking a departure from the classic 
concept of “exit, voice, and loyalty” developed by Albert Hirschman. We think that there is a necessity 
for a more complex analytical scheme in order to understand the cooperation or competition of 
emigrants with the actors in the country of origin. In particular, we believe that an elaboration of this 
analytical tool can lead to the identification and classification of actors in the countries of origin. By 
doing this, it will be possible to produce a more extended understanding of the typology of inter-actor 
relations and to reappraise transnational political practices of emigrants. 
Before approaching an explanation of this interpretative framework, it is necessary to highlight 
some of the previous definitions of the main concepts that we will use.  
First of all, we have to define what we mean by immigrant political participation. Considering the 
existing limitations on emigrants’ participation in conventional forms of political life, both in origin 
and destination countries, we will not limit the concept only to the more conventional forms of 
political participation, such as voting or standing for elections. We will then also consider political 
participation as a sum of the two following categories (Martiniello 2005): 
- conventional forms of political participation, namely voting or running for elections; voting 
for referenda; participation in advisory councils and arenas of dialogue; membership in and 
founding of political parties, pressure groups, and NGOs; lobbying activities; 
- non-conventional and extra-parliamentary forms of political participation, i.e. protests, 
demonstrations, sit-ins, political strikes, hunger strikes, civil disobedience, boycotts.  
It is also necessary to point out that some of these forms of political participation are addressed to the 
origin State institutions (electoral policy, parliamentary policy and consultative policy), while others 
occur outside the State framework (the involvement in political parties, union politics, other pressure 
groups, ethnic and communitarian mobilisations, etc.). 
A second necessary clarification concerns the different orientations of migrants’ political 
participation. Even if we are concerned here with linkages between emigrants and actors in their 
country of origin, it is necessary to consider that the different political activities undertaken by 
emigrants can be directed towards three different political arenas: the country of origin, the country of 
destination, and the supra-national or international level (Figure 1). Koslowsky (2004), for example, in 
detailing several kinds of emigrant political activity, defines those activities as “the globalization of 
domestic politics”. 
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In some cases, emigrants can act in their destination countries to promote the interests of their 
origin country, rather than promoting a change there. With respect to the international level, 
emigrants’ political mobilisation can assume two different configurations. The first one is well-
exemplified by the case of existing linkages between Kurdish mobilisations in these migrants’ 
different European destination countries (Mügge 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). A second 
configuration is of political mobilisations and advocacy or lobbying activities addressing the supra-
national organisation, as in the case of EU institutions, international institutions such as the United 
Nations, or international civil society organisations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights 
Watch. Moreover, the role of emigrants as lobbyists or influential spokespersons for their home 
countries can be also oriented towards economic multi-national actors, such as public institutions and 
private companies, in order to influence capitalist elites for the purpose of concluding new strategic 
alliances and attracting foreign direct investments and technology transfers (Gamlen 2006).  
Figure 1. The three directions of migrants’ political activities 
      
 
A third analytical premise which we propose is related to the typologies of actors implicated in 
emigrants’ political participation. We operate a key distinction between the State and Society of 
origin,
1
 in other words between State actors and non-State actors (or civil society actors) (Table 1). On 
one hand, we consider the fact that these two categories of actors may not share the same goals 
concerning their linkages with emigrants’ political participation. On the other hand, these two 
categories of actors do not generally use the same tools, due to their different institutional positions 
and their respective available means. Our purpose is to make these differences visible and to decrypt 
their relationships with emigrants. As we have pointed out in a previous work (Zapata-Barrero et al. 
2013), the existing literature does not generally differentiate between those two main categories, and 
most of the time uses them interchangeably.  
  
                                                     
1
 We use these two terms from a political science perspective. The term State does not exclude other sub-national 
governmental levels such as local authorities, whose policies may have quite important transnational effects. 
The term Society does not exclude local or close networks of migrants. 
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Table 1. Classification of State and Non-State actors 
State actors 
Different Ministries (Interior, Foreign Affairs, specific Ministries for 
emigrants or expatriate affairs), embassies, specific state-agencies for 
emigrants, local authorities, ruling parties in authoritarian states or in 
restricted democratic systems, state-owned transnational migrant institutions, 
consultative bodies, political parties. 
Civil society actors 
NGOs, national and transnational civil society groups, associations, private 
companies, trade unions, churches and religious groups. 
Source: Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013. 
Assigning these distinctions to a specific and central actor is not always clear. We refer to political 
parties, particularly in countries where the political regime is particularly closed, and where 
democratic rules are weak or absent. In these cases, the possible identification of interests between the 
ruling political party or coalition and State actors, in term of interests and means will be profound. At 
the same time, in some cases opposition political parties will be more easily classified as non-State 
actors, considering their interests, their strategies, the tools they use or the cooperation that they 
establish with emigrants. 
Nevertheless, we are conscious that these two categories cannot be considered homogeneous in 
terms of both objectives and actions, and that a multiplicity of State and non-State actors can be 
implicated in the political participation and mobilisation of migrants. 
Looking generally at the political actions developed for emigrants by origin countries, Gamlen 
(2006: 4) talks of a “constellation” of different initiatives, at different levels of the state, which are 
more or less institutionalised. Rejecting an interpretation of the state as a unitary actor coherently 
pursuing “national interests”, for example, we will then consider the State a multi-level and multi-
actor organization, with internal struggles fostered by competing interests, but also by different 
political, ideological, and economic views (Fitzgerald 2006: 260-261). 
After classifying and detecting the different State and non-State actors in origin countries, which 
are implicated in different ways in building, structuring and sustaining political relations with 
emigrants and diaspora groups, we will focus on inter-actor relations. In particular, in the following 
sections, we will introduce our interpretative framework inspired by our reappraisal of Hirschman’s 
scheme, and then we will analyse the different types of relations between the actors implicated in 
transnational political ties with emigrants. Following our scheme, emigrants’ political participation 
will be structured according to two main axes, in which the relations between actors can be 
collaborative, competitive, or neutral. 
2. A reappraisal of Hirschman’s “exit, voice, and loyalty” as overlapping categories 
Looking at strategies and actions of state and non-state actors in origin countries, we consider that 
Hirschman’s (1970; 1978) well-known distinction between voice, exit, and loyalty constitutes a very 
useful interpretative framework. 
As Hofmann (2008: 16) notes, a critical reappraisal of Hirschman’s framework “can be of 
significant heuristic value to our understanding of the dynamics of present-day migration and its social 
and political implications”. 
In our view, two main reasons justify the need for a reappraisal of Hirschman’s ideas in order to 
explain emigrants’ political participation in their origin countries. The first reason is the development 
of communication channels and networks which allow emigrants to exercise their political 
participation in origin countries in different forms, to access an almost unlimited amount of real-time 
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information about political activities, debates and protest in origin countries, and to maintain or 
establish linkages with different political and social actors in and outside of their home countries. 
A second element pushing for such a reappraisal of Hirschman’s model is the growing tendency of 
origin countries to allow citizens abroad to have double or multiple citizenship, as well as the growing 
establishment of channels for their political participation from abroad (Lafleur 2012; Zapata-Barrero et 
al. 2013). 
According to Hirschman’s idea, exit, voice, and loyalty constitute different answers towards a 
situation of dissatisfaction. Regarding exit, Hirschman explains that if people don’t agree with the 
existing situation in their countries, they can “vote with their feet” and emigrate to another country. He 
adds that “people who chose emigration were obviously dissatisfied in some way with the country and 
society they were leaving” (Hirschman 1978: 102). 
The voice option is considered any action searching to produce a change in a dissatisfactory 
situation. Loyalty constitutes the third and most conservative option towards a state of affairs. 
Hirschman articulated these options as mutually exclusive. In a re-actualization of this scheme, we 
believe that is necessary to conceive of the three options as overlapping and simultaneous. 
For example, concerning the relation between exit and voice, the author states that when an exit 
option is readily available “[…] the contribution of voice – that is of the political process – to such 
matters is likely to be and to remain limited” (Hirschman 1978: 95). The author also stresses the idea 
that migration and mass-migration constitute a way to reduce protest in home countries. Nevertheless, 
this consideration does not seem still completely valid at present. From our point of view, after the 
exit, the contribution of voice towards origin societies and political systems do not seem to be as 
limited as outlined by Hirschman in the past. The combination of an exit with a subsequent voice is a 
growing reality. 
We can thus distinguish actions that lead towards a specific combination of these three options. 
Exit may lead to the internationalisation of voice option. The transnational action of origin societies 
towards emigrants can thus be considered a transnational voice option. We also consider the exit 
option as a participation action by itself. As Hofmann (2008: 10) explains, “if a citizen, by choosing 
the exit option, can free himself from the conditions that have impeded the articulation of voice 
domestically, he might raise his voice all the louder from the outside after emigration”. 
We consider that these three actions are options in the hands of migrants, but can also be 
constructed and managed by origin states and societies. We also assume that, in spite having used an 
exit option, the State of origin’s interest is in keeping the loyalty option of its emigrants. For instance 
the origin state can develop specific policies, or even create dedicated structures to keep the loyalty of 
its emigrants. Origin State actors may also search for a political containment of citizens abroad, thus 
trying to stifle their voice option. 
However, certain groups from the society of origin can be interested in developing a voice option 
outside the territory, through the activities of emigrants, in spite of strong (or less strong) opposition 
from state actors. This voice option can be directed to produce changes in the political landscape of the 
origin countries, as well as to promote and support sub-national or transnational forms of ethno-
linguistic identities. 
As a hypothesis, we also consider the fact that the perceived reasons for emigrants’ departures play 
a key role in the formulation of these two forms of emigrants’ political participation. As Hirschman 
(1978: 95) explains, an exit can be the result of the push of an internal dispute, or can result from the 
pull of “superior management”. In other words, emigration can be pushed by a political conflict 
between the citizens and the State, or driven by a desire to improve a job situation, living standards, 
revenue, etc. 
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We consider the facts that:  
- when exit is determined mainly by economic reasons, it is more probable that emigrants’ 
political participation will take the form of exit + loyalty; 
- when exit is determined more by political reasons (repression of political opposition or of 
ethno-linguistic minority groups), it is more probable that the political activities of emigrants 
will assume the form of exit + voice. 
Following this reinterpretation of the “exit, voice, and loyalty” scheme regarding the political 
participation of emigrants, we consider the fact that Hirschman’s elements can combine in the two 
following main forms: 
- exit and voice 
- exit and loyalty 
The different combinations of exit with voice or loyalty are thus defined with respect to the effect that 
migrants’ political actions will produce on the existing political situation in origin countries. In the 
next sections, we will analyse some possible configurations of these two combinations in more detail. 
As explanatory examples, we will explore different existing political practices developed by emigrants 
in the transnational space in connection with the different origin-country actors, as outlined by the 
existing literature. 
3. Exit and loyalty: state-actors in their home countries, their strategies and actions 
towards emigrants 
In order to analyse the combination of exit and loyalty, we believe that it is necessary to understand the 
strategies of State actors in origin countries. This will not mean that we are underestimating the weight 
of emigrant behaviour, which surely can play a role in maintaining a migrant’s loyalty towards his 
country of origin without the intervention of State actors.  
In general terms, Itzigsohn (2000) suggests that the engagement of home countries towards 
emigrants is based on two main interests: on the one hand, the political containment of emigrants, 
namely controlling the impact of emigrants’ political activities on homeland politics; on the other 
hand, mobilizing emigrants’ support as lobbyists in the destination countries.  
Looking more deeply at state strategies and tools, Gamlen (2008: 842) identifies a broad 
framework of action through which the country of origin remains connected to and interacts with its 
citizens abroad. This author posits that States try to create a transnational “relationship of 
communication”, based upon the idea of the nation, which he defines as “a system of symbols and 
signs within which states can immerse the exercise of power” (Gamlen 2006: 5ff.). A second step is 
the creation of the state’s “objective capacities for the realization of power relations”, namely building 
specific diaspora institutions. A third step of this “transnational exercise of state power” consists of 
what he calls “finalized activities”, or “specific effects”, a kind of “transnationalized citizenship” 
simultaneously comprised of the extension of rights to emigrants and the extraction of obligations 
from them. As the same author explains, symbolic nation-building policies are meant to create “a 
homogeneous national ‘diaspora’, with close ties of allegiance to the home-state”, through initiatives 
that increase migrants’ sense of belonging to a transnational community and enhance the place of the 
State within the community.
2
 
As in the cases of Mexico, Morocco, and China, among others, State actors can aim to re-include 
emigrants within the national population through high-level rhetoric or symbolic gestures, prizes, or 
                                                     
2
 For a more extended systematisation of tools used by States of origin, see Zapata-Barrero et al., 2013. 
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even by celebrating emigrants as national heroes. Often this stance represents an important shift, 
considering that previously, various states denounced emigrants as deserters. 
As another tool, emigrants’ off-shore district of the state can be materially recovered in certain 
electoral systems, as in the case of Ecuador, where external electoral constituencies are created as 
special representations for emigrants, which can be considered a paternalistic (or materialistic) claim 
that expatriates are an “offshore part” of the national population. 
These policies share the state’s interest in producing “a communal mentality” for emigrants and “a 
sense of common belonging to the home-state that renders expatriates governable” (Gamlen 2006: 7). 
This kind of state actor’s activity towards emigrants is meant to maintain or (re)establish loyalty 
among its citizens abroad.  
Another action used by the state to avoid the voice option and to keep the loyalty of emigrants is 
that of implementing surveillance, through the foreign service or the migration bureaucracy, which 
select strategic actors among the emigrants to establish a long-term relationship with them.  
In some cases, the home State creates its own transnational migrant organizations, often also acting 
as consultative institutions, in order to avoid existing political tensions and to eventually contain 
possible future conflicts with emigrants. State-founded associations such as the “Amicales”, in the case 
of Morocco, are a well-known example of these practices (De Haas 2007). Another example of this is 
in Ecuador where, from the beginning of 2000, the state began to open “casas ecuatorianas” 
(Ecuadorian homes) abroad, in order to maintain a strict link to the diaspora; these were one of the 
strong axes of Rafael Correa’s political actions. One of the objectives was to ensure that 
representatives of the diaspora were not dissident voices; another goal was to use this voice in the 
destination countries of Ecuadorian emigrants (Sànchez-Montijano 2012). 
Similarly, some scholars (Gamlen 2006: 5) suggest that the Mexican state seeks to extend its 
governance of Mexican nationals into the urban and community scale of organizations, containing and 
co-opting migrant political activity by inserting state representatives into civic associations. 
3.1 Exit and loyalty: lobbying for the origin country 
Some origin countries’ actions have aimed to co-opt influential expatriates in order to realise lobbying 
activities towards destination countries and also at international level.  
A very interesting case of this is Argentina, where, at the time of the crisis on the Malvinas Islands 
in 2012, the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner sent letters to influential emigrants to 
support the state’s official position on this issue in their destination countries, as well at the 
international level (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013). This case represents a clear example of “selective 
mobilisation” of emigrants to create public opinion abroad and to promote the state’s interests at the 
international level.  
The case of Turkey is another clear example of a state’s action which targets citizens abroad as 
providers of political support and lobbying. Turkey has also tried to engage influential expatriates and 
emigrant associations in Europe, in order to push forward the state’s agenda on the issue of EU 
membership (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). This state has also sponsored academic exchanges and 
academic chairs, as a tool for pushing pro-Turkish ideologies, screening the candidates according to 
their views on the Armenian massacres (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001). 
In the case of Turkey, it is always interesting to note the efforts of the American Turkish 
community at different stages of the Cyprus crisis in the 1970s, and also the countermeasures taken by 
the much larger American Greek communities (Sheffer 2006). This case represents a good example of 
emigrant groups’ lobbying of the host-state to promote home-state interests on a very specific issue of 
international relations. In this case, the lobbying activities were conducted by diaspora groups of both 
implicated states. 
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Citizens abroad can push forward their home country’s interests in order to promote cooperation 
with host countries in different areas: stopping or releasing existing economic boycotts, restraining 
limitations on exportation and importation to and from origin countries, or fostering the liberalisation 
of tariffs and commercial flows (Sheffer 2006). 
As we have mentioned earlier, another area where emigrants’ lobbying activities can be particularly 
useful for home countries is influencing host country policymakers with respect to tariffs and 
commercial regimes. For example, the Mexican diaspora in the United States has successfully 
influenced policymakers to agree to moratoriums on loans to their homeland (Sheffer 2006). 
Regarding the case of lobbying to end economic boycotts and commercial limitations, one of the 
clearest examples is the action of the Jewish diaspora in the US, which lobbied for the end to the 
economic boycott of South Africa during the apartheid in order to help the Jewish diaspora leaving in 
this country (generating tensions not only within the diaspora, but also with other communities 
lobbying for the boycott, such as African-Americans). An analogue case is that of the Chinese 
diaspora lobbying in the US for a political and economic opening of China (Sheffer 2006). 
4. Exit and voice: competition with state-actors in home countries and cooperation with 
non-State actors 
The second configuration of emigrants’ political participation in origin countries combines exit and 
voice. The emigrant’s unconformity with the origin country’s situation thus takes the form of voice 
action in order to change the political situation in the country of origin. This option can take different 
forms, depending on the activities carried out by emigrants. 
The linkages and networks between home societies and emigrant groups in different destination 
countries to carry out political activities pertaining to origin and destination countries represent a 
complex but fundamental matter that deserves more in-depth analysis. The new analytical framework, 
as well as the distinction between State and non-State actors, can be useful to developing a deeper 
understanding of these linkages. 
In general terms, some authors have pointed out that the democratization processes of home 
countries are linked with the participation of emigrants, thereby increasing their opportunities to 
influence homeland politics (Koslowsky 2004: 5). A very fashionable debate, particularly after the 
‘Arab spring’, concerns the role of diasporas in the democratization process of their origin countries. 
The ‘Arab Spring’ case suggests that the actions of home societies in the field of political participation 
are more visible when non-state actors at home have diverging interests vis-à-vis state institutions. 
Also, when emigrant communities have fewer opportunities to participate at home, it is possible that 
they will be politically more active outside the country to change the situation at home. It is also 
important to note that these activities are not exclusive to the Arab countries. For example, Chinese 
citizens outside the country have supported movements for political change in their homeland. 
It appears particularly important to consider the centrality of new communication technologies in 
the case of interactions between emigrants and home societies (or parts of those societies), when the 
home-government or some majority or dominant social groups are unfriendly or unsympathetic to the 
specific group of emigrants (Sheffer 2006: 184). This can be the case of ethno-linguistic minority 
groups in the home country, linked with their specific diaspora – and of emigrants’ activities, linked 
with opposition homeland groups – against totalitarian or authoritarian regimes in the origin countries. 
Sheffer (2006: 182) points out that diaspora activities “[…] now include […] the mobilisation and 
transfer of economic, cultural, and political resources to homelands and other diaspora communities, 
the creation of trans-state political communities, and communication with local and global NGOs and 
IGOs”. Thus, the technological changes and the large diffusion of this new means of communication 
permit more and more emigrant groups to galvanize public opinion and to access policymakers, 
regardless of their economic and political resources and irrespective of their location.  
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5. Exit and voice: transnational links with the country of origin and other immigrant 
destinations  
Østergaard-Nielsen (2001: 13), for instance, suggests that homeland political organizations can 
coordinate their campaigns with sister organisations elsewhere, pooling financial resources and 
drawing on their expertise and manpower, or with political counterparts in other countries, producing 
joint informational material or organizing and coordinating confrontational activities 
(demonstrations/mass meetings).  
In some cases, as Sheffer (2006: 201) has clearly pointed out, host countries try to take advantage 
of emigrants’ contrast conflicts with their origin countries’ governments. In these instances, 
destination countries can support the criticisms of migrants towards political regimes in their 
homelands, and, at times, even encourage migrant activities against homeland governments, with the 
risk of creating a political confrontation between origin and destination countries. One of the clearest 
examples of this situation is the activities of the Cuban diaspora in the US against the political regime 
in their homeland. 
Another way in which exit and voice can combine in the political activities of emigrants that are 
meant to bring about a change in origin countries can be through channelling campaign contributions 
and other form of material support to opposition political parties. Koslowsky (2004: 14) suggests that 
the importance of this “less visible but perhaps more influential way” can be also linked to the 
different weight of external currencies, compared to those of home countries, in the election process. 
In the first free election in East European countries, for example, a 50 dollar donation coming from a 
Polish resident in the US equalled a third of the monthly wage of a Pole residing in the country 
(Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013). Another example in this sense is the campaign of Franjo Tudjiman, 
leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which started to raise funds from emigrants in the 
US, even before non-communist parties were legalized in Yugoslavia. Apparently, around 80% of the 
expenses of Croatian political parties in the 1990 election were covered with funds coming from 
Croatian emigrants and their descendents (Koslowsky 2004).  
Another case in which the political actions of emigrants can influence the homeland political 
situation, following the agenda of some specific non-state actors in origin countries, is supporting 
identity-groups that are alternatives to the dominant groups. Emigrants’ economic backing can inspire 
and also lead movements projecting national visions that transcend existing state boundaries, as well 
as revive ‘dormant’ sub-national identities (Koslowsky 2004: 21). In this case, the challenges posed by 
these kinds of emigrant actions for multi-national origin countries are evident. 
The case of the Kurdish diaspora is particularly emblematic of the role that emigrants can play in 
movements pursuing a national project, in this case trespassing the existing state boundaries of several 
nation-states (Koslowsky 2004). Some parts of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe have been instrumental 
in internationalizing the politics of Kurdish separatism and bringing Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish 
minority to the attention of European countries through different activities (hunger strikes, protest 
marches and terrorist bombings in Germany) (Lyon and Uçarer 2004). 
Again, the case of Croatian emigrants is particularly relevant on the issue of reviving ‘dormant’ 
sub-national identities. We are referring to the role that they play as a lobbying group for German 
diplomatic recognition of their independence. Very similarly, Croatian emigrants in the US helped to 
establish Croatian diplomatic offices in Washington and have also used lobbying activities to push the 
US to adopt a diplomatic recognition of Croatia, as they did in Germany (Koslowsky 2004: 16). 
Similar cases have occurred in other parts of former Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia, where emigrants supported nationalist revivals, which led to the dismantling of multi-
ethnic states. Kosovo-Albanian emigrants, for example, played this role in the Kosovar self-
determination movement. 
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5.1 Exit and voice: lobbying against the origin State 
In this sense, two types of actions can be profitable for non-state actors in home societies to push 
forward their agendas, permitting emigrant groups to express criticism of their home government, or 
transmit demands concerning its expected behaviour.  
The first way that origin countries’ non-state actors can choose to strengthen their actions is to use 
global institutional structures to facilitate transnational political practices. We are referring particularly 
to international organizations that, under the umbrella of human rights, can provide an essential 
framework to negotiation between transnational political networks and home countries. As 
Østergaard-Nielsen (2001: 15) has pointed out, “transnational political networks who oppose a state, 
which has strong allies in their host-states or simply is too powerful for other states to meddle with, 
may turn to international organizations such as the UN, OSCE, European Council, and the like”. As 
the same author suggests, in this framework, the role of NGOs in ‘trans-state advocacy’ can be very 
useful to facilitating contacts between those transnational political networks and the level of 
policymakers that would otherwise be unlikely to reach emigrant groups. 
Emigrants can also engage in lobbying activities to impose boycotts and sanctions on their home 
countries, as well as establish specific political positions in international relations, as demonstrated in 
the case of certain groups in the Cuban and Iranian diasporas in the United States, as well as by the 
Iraqi diaspora in Europe, which mobilised against the regime of Saddam Hussein (Sheffer 2006). 
Another example of these strategies is the case of the PLO’s (Palestinian Liberation Organization) 
longstanding lobbying activities for recognition of Palestine as a member of the UN. Similarly, the 
Tibetan diaspora has conducted international advocacy to support independent claims and respect for 
human rights in the region by the Chinese state. Another similar example is the Kurdish expatriates’ 
action, mentioned earlier. 
The second option that non-state actors have to push forward their agenda through transnational 
political activities involving the diaspora is through new technologies. Sheffer (2006) underlines the 
importance of these new technologies, which are mainly internet connections but also satellite 
broadcasting and new electronic media for diaspora activities. As the same author explains, these 
changes have substantially transformed the nature of interactions between diaspora groups and 
governmental and non-governmental organizations in origin and destination countries (Sheffer 2006). 
Considering the explosive increase in the use of the internet in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, it is 
necessary to take these changes into account in order to understand the influence of home societies 
towards emigrants’ political participation in both homelands and host countries. Nevertheless, we 
figure that this is a very complex area to explore, due to the multiple potential interactions at this level, 
and also due to their fast changing nature. 
6. Conclusions 
This work represents a first step of conceptualisation of Hirschman’s inspired conceptual framework. 
Our objective here is to formulate a framework that is useful to analyse and interpret the transnational 
political participation of immigrants, while also considering their relations with the different actors 
and stakeholders at origin.  
We are conscious that a deeper conceptual development is needed on some specific aspects, and 
that more intensive testing at the empirical level is necessary. The application of this conceptual 
framework to different empirical case studies will also constitute a more conclusive test to verify our 
preliminary hypothesis regarding the weight of the reasons behind the emigration process when 
orienting the political activity of migrants to voice or loyalty towards the origin country. In theoretical 
terms, the difference between the two categories of emigration drivers is relatively clear. Meanwhile, 
in empirical terms, this difference becomes less clear; an important amount of the migration process is 
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driven by mixed elements. At the moment, considering the information drawn from the existing 
literature, this hypothesis seems to have some value. 
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